Introduction
During the last two decades, and especially within the past ten years, the term 'populism' has become one of the most common but also vague buzzwords among They have also debated extensively their relation to democratic and representative institutions as well as their potential for further electoral gains with reference to their 'populist', 'national-populist' or 'exclusivist populist' character. But ever since the introduction of the category of 'populism' as a basic descriptive and analytical tool in accounting for such formations, very few have ever re-examined in a consistent and systematic way the very applicability of the term to this type of political forces, which sometimes includes even extremist, fascist or neo-Nazi ones.
As a result, we often see 'populism' being used as synonymous to right-wing populism or to the populist extreme right, or even to the extremist neo-Nazi right, a reified association that ignores both the global diversity of populist phenomena (which, in Latin America, for example, are mostly located on the Left) as well as the increasingly diversified picture within Europe itself. Indeed the dynamic emergence of populist parties that belong to the Left or even the radical Left, like SYRIZA in Greece or PODEMOS in Spain, or others that are rather hard to locate on the political spectrum, like Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in Italy, seems to have radically altered the European picture.
Challenging this arguably euro-centric trend, we purport to revisit and problematize the very applicability of the category of 'populism' to far right, radical right or extreme right parties within Europe. Focusing on examples from relevant parties in two key-countries (France and the Netherlands), and by applying a discourse-theoretical methodology inspired by the so-called 'Essex School' -drawing on and further operationalizing the theoretical input of Ernesto Laclau (1977 Laclau ( , 1980 2005) -, we will put forward the hypothesis that such parties are better categorized as nationalist, xenophobic, maybe even elitist, and only secondarily -if at all -as 'populist'. The formulation of this hypothesis has also been inspired by recent remarks by a series of scholars (see Di Tella, 1997; Ignazi, 2006; Mudde 2007; Caiani and Della Porta, 2011; Wodak 2014 Wodak , 2015 who have stressed that the central characteristic in the discourse of such parties is an emphasis on the protection of the Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 nation, of the native people and culture, against the enemies of the nation and its dangerous 'others': immigrants, foreigners or some other perceived external threat. If this is the case, their references to the 'people' may have to be seen as rhetorical vehicles of nationalism, relegating a typically populist antagonism towards the elite to the periphery of their discursive articulation. In other words, our main claim is that in various discourses that are 'by default' considered to be populist, what occupies the limelight is not an antagonism between a 'people' and an 'establishment' or a 'power bloc', as is the case typically with populism. It is rather the opposition between a homogenous ethnic community and its ethno-cultural 'other', something that indicates a narrative highlighting 'the centrality and supremacy of the nation and nationalism', resembling a nationalist myth par excellence (see Hainsworth, 2008, pp. 77-78; Minkenberg, 2002, p. 337) .
In this context, we will propose a rigorous discursive methodology that may be able to distinguish 'populist' from 'nationalist' (xenophobic, racist, etc.) discourses by differentially identifying the core signifiers in every discourse in relation to the peripheral ones and by clarifying the way in which the antagonistic divide is constructed and signified in each discursive architectonics.
Populism and the Extreme-Right
In a recently published monograph, Stijn van Kessel acknowledges that in 'the European context, populism is habitually associated with xenophobic politics and parties of the extreme or radical right (and therefore considered to be dangerous)'. This, he continues, 'is not surprising, since populism in Western Europe has often been expressed by parties characterised by a nationalist and culturally conservative ideology, and hostility towards immigration and multiculturalism. The European Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 academic literature has therefore also mainly considered populism as an element of "the right" ' (van Kessel, 2015, p. 2 (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322) . In this context, it does not come as a surprise that in their oft-cited paper they conclude that the nationalist, xenophobic and racist Vlaams Blok constitutes a case of 'thick' or 'full' populism par excellence, with its
Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 exclusivist and extreme nationalist discourse playing a key-role in understanding it as such: 'it is the party's extreme nationalism -the party wants to break up the Belgian state and set up a separate Flemish state -that explains its populism' (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 336) . Some short of strong enmity against internal enemies, enemies 'within the people,' 'scapegoats' to be eradicated, 'removed from the territory of the people' (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 324) , becomes here a necessary precondition, a qualifier for populism.
Last but not least, a similar association can be found in a recent Green
European Foundation publication entitled Populism in Europe (Meijers, 2011) . Thus, while the title refers to European populism in general, the actual content of the book is dedicated almost exclusively to right-wing, nationalist and xenophobic political parties and the ways to deal with them, effectively equating the extreme right with populism. It is quite telling that the editor of this publication, Erica Meijers, suggests that the populists' 'proclaimed aim is to protect the identity of the "Christian Western civilisation" by closing borders and attacking cultural, ethnic and religious minorities' and that they 'create an unbridgeable gap between the "bad" elite, the "good" people and the "other" (usually minority groups) ' (Meijers, 2011, p. 5) . Furthermore, Meijers suggests that '[p] opulists use the term "people" in an absolute and exclusive way' (Meijers, 2011, pp. 11-12) , while, at the same time, they are 'harping on the old "mechanisms of exclusion and xenophobic nationalism" ' (Meijers, 2011, pp. 7-8) . No reasons as to why such characteristics have to apply to populism tout court and are not indicative of something more accurately described as xenophobic, extreme right nationalism are offered. Likewise, no clear rationale is usually provided at the conceptual level by all those choosing to describe the Greek Golden Dawn, a neoΝazi para-military organization, as populist (Anastasakis, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 Vasilopoulou, 2013). Such approaches seem to ignore or overlook Cas Mudde'snow classic -monograph on the populist radical right, where he explicitly stresses that 'nativism, not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family' (Mudde, 2007, p. 26) . In fact, populism only comes third, as an ideological feature that defines such parties, after nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 22-23) .
In an effort to draw the line between outright nationalist, xenophobic or extremist/neo-Nazi parties and populism, and to avoid the reification of a potentially problematic association, we employ in this paper a discursive approach based on the two minimal criteria emanating from the work of Ernesto Laclau and the so-called 'Essex School' (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Phillips & Jorgensen 2002; Townshend 2003 Townshend , 2004 . These criteria are also relevant to -if not reflected on -the currently emerging academic consensus on a 'minimal' definition of populism (see van Kessel, 2015; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Canovan, 1999 ; also see Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, pp. 121-124) . We then apply these criteria in 'classic', widely 
Using Minimal Criteria to Analyse Populism: An Essex School Approach
Despite the various conceptualizations of populism and the differing analytical models that have been put forth during the past few years, there is now a clearly emerging consensus on its core (or 'minimal') characteristics. This broad consensus around so-called discursive or ideological/ideational approaches (see de la Torre, 2015; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Panizza, 2005) seems to validate the two 'operational criteria' put forward by discursive scholars (Laclau, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2004 is a predominantly antagonistic one, dividing the social field between two antagonistic camps: 'the people' (the underdog, the non-privileged, the 'many', and so on), on the one side, and the 'elite' (the establishment, the power bloc, and so on), on the other. This is indeed how Laclau's logic of equivalence manifests itself: through the production of populist (discursive) chains of equivalence, a term signifying the articulatory mechanism through which different identities and demands become 'equivalent' in their opposition to a common 'enemy' (Laclau, 2005, pp. 77-83) .
When these two discursive conditions are in place at the same time, it is assumed that it is rather safe to identify a party or a movement as 'populist' (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014) .
Although emanating from a very different intellectual tradition, this definition, based on minimal criteria and already employed in a number of empirical analyses (see, for example Stavrakakis, 2003 Stavrakakis, , 2005 Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Katsambekis, 2016) , shares a lot with the ground-breaking work of scholars who have stressed the merits of Sartorian minimal definitions when it comes to empirical Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 comparative research (van Kessel, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) . At the same time, it may avoid certain shortcomings present in these definitions. Despite the significant steps taken by such scholars, it seems difficult to register the importance they place on relating or even equating populism with a strictly moralistic view (developed along the good/evil and pure/corrupt axes) and a homogenizing construction of the people. When given at the level of a definition, such assumptions tend to produce a latent analytical and normative bias, thus blurring the specificities of the cases under focus, much more than facilitating their clarification. Why, in other words, should one exclusively associate a moralistic framing of antagonistic divides and a homogenizing view of political subjectivity with populism? Could it be that such assumptions stem from a latent association of populism with the extreme or radical right, where understanding the people as a homogenous nation is more common, as well as understanding the enemies of the people-as-nation as fundamentally evil? After all, one is to find the first formulation of such a moralistic 'minimal' definition on a classic monograph dedicated to the 'radical right' (Mudde, 2007) .
Furthermore, it has been substantiated that in many cases such claims regarding moralism and homogeneity do not hold true (see Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Katsambekis, 2016) , to the extent that a populist discourse can indeed construct forms of popular unity (not homogeneity) without effectively homogenizing the popular subject and without necessarily stigmatizing the political opponent in moralistic terms, but in straightforward political ones. In addition, although traced in certain populist phenomena (for example, Chavismo), attributions of purity and moralistic idealization -probably remnants of a religious imagery reemerging in secular form -can be also encountered in a variety of discourses articulated around very different nodal points. De la Torre is right to point out that such narratives of redemption epitomize 'the saga of the people, the proletariat, the indigenous, or the nation' (De la Torre, 2015, p. 10) . It is thus difficult to see how this criterion could help in the differential identification of populist discourses.
Last but not least, for many influential critical political theorists, the turn to moralistic discourse, 'the displacement of politics by morality', constitutes a defining characteristic of anti-populist consensual politics positioned beyond left and right;
here moral condemnation is revealed as a neoliberal strategy of exorcising the populist challenge (Mouffe, 2002, pp. 1, 14) . If this is indeed the case, then, once more, this criterion cannot form part of a minimal definition of populism. Thus, in order to be in a better position to deal with the vast plurality of populist hybrids and to identify the characteristics peculiar to them, in order to arrive at a truly minimal and operational definition of populism, one would have to bracket the significance of moral investment and idealization. By following this course, by 'purifying' the definitions put forward by the 'new mainstream' in populism studies, we will quickly realize that we are left with a definition very close to the one given by Laclau roughly forty years ago and further developed since then (Laclau, 1977, pp. 172-173; 1980; . Such a definition understands populism as a formal political and discursive logic, a performative process which constructs and represents society as ultimately divided between two groups, 'the people' and 'the elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the will of the people. 2 It is crucial to stress here that while this conceptualization also bears similarities with a body of work that understands populism more as a political communication style (e.g. Moffitt 2016; something secondary or superficial -an unavoidable connotation of 'style'.
Moreover, by sticking to the notion of discourse, our analysis can employ a widely tested, elaborate and solid methodology within the constantly evolving field of discourse studies (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000; Angermuller, 2014; Angermuller, Maingueneau & Wodak 2014) . After all, even researchers that prefer to understand populism as 'style', most often end up performing a discourse analysis of sorts when conducting empirical research. For example, Jagers and Walgrave end up describing their analytical effort as 'comparative discourse analysis' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 319) .
Research Design and Country/Case Selections
With these theoretical/methodological priorities in mind, we can now proceed with briefly examining the particular logics that govern the discourse of specific parties regarded as belonging to the populist extreme right or populist right; the core signifiers around which their discourse is articulated, as well as the ways in which social antagonisms are framed and signified. Our aim is to show that by utilizing a formal discursive methodology premised on minimal criteria one can hope to clarify the role of populist signifiers and logics in a given discourse, while at the same time draw meaningful comparisons with diverging cases. Our minimal criteria here can be reformulated as abstract questions: (1) Is the 'people' the central reference of a given discourse? (2) Is this people opposed to an established power bloc? In this sense, the emphasis that we put here on discourse leads us, as a first step, to investigate the exact position of populist signifiers: i.e. where do we locate the reference to 'the people' in an extreme-right populist discourse? Is it indeed a nodal point, placed at the very core of its articulation, or is it located in the periphery? If at the core of these discourses we find an ethnic community (conceptualized either in political or in ethnic/racial terms) and if the enemy against which they mobilize is, once more, illustrated in nationalist terms, shouldn't we better understand these discourses as predominantly nationalist?
However, to the extent that in extreme right discourses one expects to find numerous references to both 'people' and 'nation', one would need to take a second step in order to strengthen the applicability of the two minimal criteria (identifying both the central position of the 'people' in discursive architectonics as well as the dichotomization of the socio-political terrain between a popular and an elite camp)
by inquiring into how exactly, in each case, the people and the elite are constructed, articulated and illustrated (Who is the people? Who is the elite?). From a formal, discursive perspective prioritizing differential identification, the hypothesis here would be that in populist discourses proper, apart from being located at the core of the discursive articulation, 'the people' would function as an empty signifier, as a signifier without signified, so to speak (Laclau 2005, pp. 69-72, 161-163 
Positioning 'the People', Signifying Antagonisms
We will now proceed with brief overviews of our cases, highlighting their specific characteristics in light of the minimal criteria approach presented and operationalized above. First, we are interested in clarifying the position of 'the people' as well as its relation with other core signifiers representing political subjectivity in every case.
More specifically, we aim to clarify if it is placed at the core of a given articulation, functioning as a populist empty signifier purporting to articulate an expanding plurality of social demands, or at the periphery in both its senses: in terms of architectonics (indicating a marginal and secondary position within a given discursive articulation) or in terms of functioning as a mere rhetorical vehicle of a prioritized and often naturalized nationalist signification. Our inquiry on this level could also be formulated in terms of interrogating the type of political subjectivity constructed through a given interpellation of 'the people'. Second, we focus on the antagonistic schemas that each discourse is putting forward, in order to establish whether they are compatible with a formal populist logic or not. Our aim here is to clarify the specific characteristics of a given pattern of articulation in terms of constructing populist (or non-populist) polarities. (Vossen, 2011, p. 184) . No doubt, from the very beginning of this new phase in his career, Wilders identifies one ultimate enemy in his discourse: Islam, which is perceived both as a threat to the Dutch culture and way of life, but as a serious security threat too. Indeed, Wilders' islamophobia is 'based on apocalyptic conspiracy theories on the coming Islamification of Europe' (Vossen, 2011, p. 184) and is over-determining almost every aspect of his discourse and ideology.
Geert Wilders and the PVV in the Netherlands
It is noteworthy that in Vossen's enumeration of Wilder's characteristics, populism comes only fourth. What is more, Vossen himself immediately links Wilders' alleged populism to his islamophobia. In his own words, the latter refers 'to the common people who are fed up with criminality, Islamisation and politics in general and who demand immediate action' (Vossen, 2011, p. 185 Wilders, 2008; Dutch News, 2010) .
Another example that offers a very graphic illustration of how Wilders is framing socio-political antagonisms in his discourse comes from the recent electoral campaign for the 2012 elections, in which the PVV chose to oppose Europe. The title of the electoral manifesto of the PVV was: 'Their Brussels, our Netherlands' (PVV, 2012). And while this slogan can be considered as an attack against Europe's antidemocratic bureaucratization and its alienated 'elites' (see van Kessel, 2014) , it is very clear that 'us' versus 'them' refers primarily to a battle between 'our nation' ('our Netherlands') and an external organization, the EU, which is often presented as a monstrous 'super-state' (see Wilders, 2011 (Wilders, 2011 ; emphasis added).
Tellingly enough, when very recently Wilders co-hosted a news conference with
Marine Le Pen to present their newly established bloc in the European Parliament, he stressed that their ultimate aim was to 'fight the "Islamisation" of Europe' (Saeedy, 2015) . In this context, Wilders does not hesitate to often talk about a war-like situation between his notions of the West and Islam (Wilders, 2014a; 2014b; 2015b) .
Thus it does not come as a surprise that the clear solution that he ends up proposing is the return to the nation and to the most classic sense of nationalism framed in essentialist (and quasi-metaphysical) terms: 'The peoples of the free world will only be able to fight back against Islam if they can rally around a flag with which they can identify. This flag, symbolizing pre-political loyalty, can only be the flag of our nation' (Wilders, 2011) . In this sense, the people are constructed as a strictly ethnic people, and can be united only around a symbol which exerts some sort of prepolitical and thus unmediated loyalty to the nation, which needs to be empowered against the 'multiculturalists' that, according to Wilders, 'aim to destroy it' (Wilders, 2011) .
In this sense the people becomes completely indistinguishable from the nation. We have registered similar remarks from the majority of experts we have interviewed in the Netherlands during our field research, which highlight both the exclusivist nature of Wilders' discourse, but also its primarily nationalist or nativist character. 
Marine Le Pen and the FN in France: The Nation Against Cosmopolitan Globalization
The FN is largely considered to be the archetype, indeed the cradle of contemporary extreme right-wing populism in Europe. Founded in 1972, after various attempts to unite the French extreme right (Fieschi, 2004, p. 1; Rydgren, 2004, pp. 17-19) , it gained momentum under the charismatic leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who had already started a political career within the Poujadist movement (Davies, 1999, p. 3).
The FN had its first electoral breakthrough back in 1984 and has managed to establish its position ever since within the French political scene (Shields, 2007, p. 278) . After the passage from Jean-Marie Le Pen to his daughter, Marine Le Pen, the party continued to rise, achieving a first place in the European election of 2014, which constitutes its best electoral result so far. What was it that made such a trajectory possible? Part of the literature has suggested that this was due to the FN's long but consistent turn towards more moderate positions, the strategy of dédiabolisation, that took place at least at the level of political communication and public presence (Kuhn, 2014, p. 408) . On the other hand, according to Aurélien Mondon, beneath the carefully structured 'moderate' profile of Marine Le Pen one finds exactly the same programme on which the FN has diachronically built its public profile and momentum, stressing anti-immigrant policies, based on nationalism and intolerance (Mondon, 2012) . Now, what have been the basic discursive patterns along which the FN has diachronically built its identity? As we know, one of the first slogans used by the FN was 'France for the French', which in the past had also been used by fascist regimes.
Its profile was thus built from the beginning around a notion of national identity, around the French family and French traditional values, while presenting the national community under a constant threat (Davies, 1999, p. 20; Shields, 2007, p. 218) . To be sure, the way that the FN constructs the people-as-nation today does not involve racial connotations. It is mostly premised on a kind of differentialist racism, stressing the differences and the incompatibility of certain cultures (mainly Islam) with Western European, and especially French values. The FN is thus referring to the abstract figure of the immigrant as an internal threat to the nation's culture, its integrity, its values.
Islam is also openly targeted here (Davies, 1999, pp. 26, 43) , but not with the severity seen in Wilders' discourse. An external enemy is also recognized, which is mostly identified with globalization and the forces of cosmopolitanism, that threaten to corrode the nation (Davies, 1999, p. 22) ; especially during the past few years the European Union itself has become one of the arch-enemies of the FN. In this context, the EU is -in Marine Le Pen's words -regarded as 'deeply harmful', or even as 'an anti-democratic monster'. Indeed Le Pen does not hesitate to even state that she wants 'to destroy the EU' on the grounds of regaining popular sovereignty, which is here, importantly, synonymous with national sovereignty (Le Pen, in van Rhor, 2014). That is why we see the emergence of radical Islamism or other kinds of radical communitarianism. [...] We say that we need to be cautious, since there are limits in terms of space and capacity of assimilation and integration. The democratic contract today is in danger due to the massiveness of immigration. We do not have time to integrate them (informant A, interview, Brussels, 14 October 2014, emphasis added).
In this context, the FN today has focused its anti-immigrant rhetoric on the inability of the French state to integrate any more populations, avoiding references to the danger of 'contaminating' the native culture with alien traditions, but also linking it to the democratic process and the dangers that non-integrated immigrants pose for democracy. On another level, the FN has also intensified its attacks on the 'globalized system of banks and super-structures', attacking those that want to establish a system of 'global governance' that cannot be held accountable to the people in a democratic way. It is obvious then that the FN is trying today to articulate the various aspects of its discourse with the contemporary problems of democracy, in an effort to escape its categorization as 'extreme' or 'dangerous'. Thus, when it comes to representing the people, Le Pen's response is that '[w]e want to represent all the French people with ideas that are neither left nor right: patriotism, defence of the identity and sovereignty of the people' (Le Pen, in van Rhor, 2014, our emphasis). At the same time though, Le Pen makes it clear that representing and defending the people ultimately means to represent and defend the nation. This overlapping is obvious when she stresses that:
'The European Union is working to destroy the nation and we are here to defend our people' (Marine Le Pen, in Saeedy, 2015) .
To sum up, the FN clearly constructs 'the people' as a subject organically and exclusively linked to the nation. At the same time, it excludes substantial parts of the immigrant populations from the French people in terms of their incomplete Published in Critical Discourse Studies, 14(4), 2017 , pp. 420-439, DOI: 10.1080 /17405904.2017 integration or the very inability of the French state to integrate them due to inflexible limitations (territory, capacity of the economy, etc.). Its interpellation upon the people is structured along an antagonistic logic, on the basis of recognizing an internal and an external enemy: on the inside the enemy is the non-integrated immigrant and the various forms of radicalism that may originate from such parts of the population; on the outside, the enemy is identified with the abstract force of cosmopolitan globalization and the looming threat of 'global governance' (one finds here the 'transnational elites', EU bureaucracy, the US, institutions such as Goldman Sachs, 
Conclusion
After surveying, from a discourse-theoretical point of view, parties that are categorized -usually by default -as right or extreme right-wing populist, we can revisit the reified association between the extreme-right and the 'populist' designation. We can thus firstly claim that contemporary research needs to acknowledge the priority of nationalist and xenophobic, anti-immigrant and more generally exclusivist elements in the discourse of these parties. In this sense, Ruth
Wodak is correct when she stresses 'the overtly nationalistic orientation of such movements' (Wodak, 2014) and their 'exclusionary agenda' (Wodak, 2015, p. 2) ;
something also registered in recent attempts to distinguish inclusionary from exclusionary types of populism within mainstream political science (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013) . Here a perspective focusing on discursive architectonics as well as on the intricacies of signification can reinforce the conclusions of such orientations offering them an additional grounding.
These discursive and ideological elements, not only delimit this party family, but are often more important as a defining trait than their alleged 'populism'.
Populism may still be an element in certain extreme-right parties, but it is clearly not the core discursive/ideological feature on the basis of which one can understand the specificity of their profile, differentially determine their identity and subsequently ascribe the 'populist' label to them as the most fitting and primary designation. as one of the core characteristics of fascism. To be more specific, Roger Griffin has defined fascism as a 'palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism' (Griffin, 2006: 32, 44) . John Richardson has eloquently summarized the various critiques against
Griffin, but more crucially, he has also stressed that 'it is the anti-democratic weltanschauung and violent methods which set fascism apart from parliamentary right-wing politics' (Richardson, forthcoming) . This does not mean that populist elements cannot be found in fascist discourses. The task here, as with our inquiry, has more to do with carefully tracing the core features that define specific parties and Here, radical and exclusionary nationalism is clearly recognized as the ideological core of the party, with populism functioning as a positioning strategy, contingently articulated with nationalism (De Cleen, 2016, p. 87 Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; March, 2011) . This needs to be taken seriously into account and inform contemporary comparative approaches in a bid to build meaningful typologies: 'Left-wing and right-wing populist parties differ in important aspects, namely in that the latter are inwards looking, thus primarily nationalist/chauvinist, referring to a nativist body politics, while left-wing populist parties are traditionally oriented towards internationalism or post-nationalism' (Wodak, 2015, p. 8) .
Our inquiry here offers a first mapping of these characteristics and a critical re-assessment of their alleged populism through the utilization of discursive 'minimal criteria'. The minimum similarities that we discerned among these parties, despite their different versions of nationalism or the different degrees of their alleged populism, can be formulated as follows. Starting from the national-popular side, even when the 'people' acquires a prominent place within an extreme-right discursive ensemble, the nation and the national community, in its different forms, is primarily and almost exclusively understood as the true meaning, the transcendental signified of the 'people'. 'The people' thus acquires an exclusivist character, excluding, in particular, the non-native, the foreigner, or even the non-integrated co-citizen on the basis of preserving a homogenous and indivisible people-as-nation. Hence, the (Pelinka in Wodak, 2015, p. 4) . The crucial question, highlighted by our analysis, is whether it would be more analytically accurate, theoretically and methodologically consistent -as well as strategically more productive -to reconstruct this discursive movement as an attempt to articulate populist elements into discourses that remain, however, predominantly ethno-nationalist and xenophobic. To the extent that, as we have tried to show, the latter can be clearly differentiated from the inclusionary populist canon, they should not be primarily designated as 'populist'. With this statement, we are not arguing that right-wing or even extreme-right orientations necessarily exclude populism from the chains of signification they construct.
Populism can still be a significant element within such discourses, as illustrated in our argument. But it is crucial to be able to establish if it is the defining element vis-à-vis others or not. At the same time, it is also crucial for contemporary political research to explore the existence of 'mixed cases,' where nationalist elements are articulated with progressive agendas and participatory discourses with very strong leaderships (as is the case, maybe, with Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in Italy).
Finally, what extreme-right framings of socio-political stakes reveal, is an ultimately protectionist (even isolationist) conception of the nation, which refers the people back to the traditional national community and -involving less tolerant views regarding religion, ethnicity or even sexual orientation (this refers to the FN and not the PVV, which is openly advocating gay rights) -puts restraints on social inclusivity and universal participation in political affairs. In this sense, such discourses can be regarded as potentially harmful to any sense of democratic expansion; a hypothesis that should inform contemporary accounts on the relation of such parties with democracy. Such views, clearly contrast with the inclusive and egalitarian conception of the popular community, which we typically find in populist discourses on the left of the political spectrum, illustrating the variability of popular/populist interpellations.
To be sure, it is the task of contemporary political research to register these developments and to re-asses the terms of categorization applied to such parties by clearly identifying the formal logics implicit in their public appeal. What we offer here is a method to proceed with such categorizations through a discursive framework in the Essex School tradition. It is hoped that through such a reassessment we will not only clarify further the peculiarities of populism as such -as well as the role and nature of its presence as a 'secondary strategy' or 'strategic amplifier' of other ideologies, such as nationalism, or the existence of in-between categories of discursive articulation of a national-populist type. We may also arrive at a better position to understand the consequences of today's extreme-right parties on democratic institutions and the prospects for democratic expansion in Europe more generally.
Notes
1. According to an Essex School perspective, discourse formation involves the partial fixation of a series of signifiers (the moments of a discourse) around a point of reference, a signifier that structures their articulation: this is the operation performed by the nodal point (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000) .
2. This is, of course, Cas Mudde's definition of populism without the rather unnecessary moralistic adjectives (Mudde, 2007) .
3. See, for more details: www.populismus.gr 4. Other expert informants that agreed with this assumption were Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah de Lange and Dick Pels.
